Literature and the Possibilities of Language Function by Akwanya, Amechi N.
Journal of Studies in Social Sciences 
ISSN 2201-4624 
Volume 11, Number 2, 2015, 233-254 
©  Copyright 2015 the authors.                                                         233 
 
Literature and the Possibilities of Language Function 
 
Amechi N. Akwanya 
Department of English & Literary Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria 
 
Abstract. The variety of human activities and needs gives rise to a plurality of language functions, among 
them communication. However, communication is so highly rated that for many this is not merely a 
function, but the key factor that defines the reality of language. This high rating of communication has 
important consequences. For example, the variety of functions tends to be reduced to forms of 
communication. On the other hand, it leaves language in an environment to function in anonymity and 
pure transparency, becoming a point of serious discussion only within academic linguistics. Among literary 
scholars, it is either ignored just as in the common usage or it is discussed under one theme or another of 
academic linguistics. Between these two extremes, however, lies a deep question as to what language is to 
literature. This is the question opened up in this paper; and it is postulated that an adequate account of the 
relation of language and literature may only be attempted within a theory of literature. 
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Introduction 
The attitude that literature is used to convey messages is common in African institutions 
and it is tied to the view of language as a means of communication, which does not 
encourage better than ordinary, that is, conversational awareness and sensitivity towards 
language. This, however, is not seen as disturbing even among literary scholars since the 
language of this literature is that of the former colonists. Close attention to literary art 
inevitably discloses deep questions about language, questions which arise in different 
ways for the reader-critic, for the literary artist and for the literary translator. The artist 
and the translator seem to be charged in a special way with watching over language, the 
translator over the language the work is going to take a body in, to ensure that the work 
retains its identity and vitality in the new language. The literary artist, on the other hand, 
watches over the language he works with, in which his artwork must come to life. 
Therefore, what the language is to the literary artist and the translator must be different 
things. The evidence from the Polish writer Czesław Miłosz, a long-time resident in the 
West, is a relationship of deep responsibility to his native Polish in which he writes and 
into which he translated major cultural, religious, and literary texts of different languages, 
including biblical Hebrew and Greek. The question of language in African literature was 
raised at the emergence of modern African writing more than half a century ago by 
Obiajunwa Wali. This new literature was in the language of the former colonists; and so 
the question was whether the writers could genuinely serve art or serve the adopted 
language. It comes down to this: whether African literary art could be art in the same way 
for artists working in their own native languages; therefore, what is literary art, and what 
is the nature of the configuration to language? 
 
Intentional Object 
In Aristotle’s Ethics, art is described in terms of human practical activity, and consists of 
‘a certain state of mind, apt to Make, conjoined with true Reason [and] employed upon 
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Contingent matter’ (133). Here he is chiefly concerned with the artist, the one with ‘a 
certain state of mind, apt to make’, and not immediately with ‘the made thing’, the 
artwork, which results when the appropriate state of mind ‘conjoined with true reason’ 
is ‘employed upon contingent matter’. A work of art does not come by accident, but 
requires the exercise of reason: it is intentional. The artwork is an intentional object insofar 
as it is by exercise of intention upon ‘contingent matter’ that a work comes forth: the work 
is directly what the artist intends. 
 Aristotle’s theory of art requires to be carefully studied. The basic principles he 
enunciates remain valid today, but they are often taken amiss and thus lead to widely 
divergent views of art. For instance, the question of intention here. The humanist account 
of intention is that the work contains an intention, namely something the artist wishes to 
get across to the audience. But in Aristotle, the employment of ‘true reason’ upon 
‘contingent matter’ can succeed or fail to the extent that the product comes out as or falls 
short of art. We shall also see a problem of the same kind in explaining the role of 
language in poetry. But we must take it that not everything an artist produces by exercise 
of ‘true reason’ is necessarily an artwork; nor are artworks indifferent as to scale: some 
may command ‘more serious attention’ (On the Art of Poetry, chapter 9) than others. 
Aristotle’s discussion of the good and the bad in tragedy is instructive: 
The poet's aim, then, should be to combine every element of interest, if possible, or 
else the more important and the major part of them. This is now especially necessary 
owing to the unfair criticism to which the poet is subjected in these days. Just because 
there have been poets before him strong in the several species of tragedy, the critics 
now expect the one man to surpass that which was the strong point of each one of his 
predecessors. One should also remember what has been said more than once, and not 
write a tragedy on an epic body of incident (i.e. one with a plurality of stories in it), 
by attempting to dramatize, for instance, the entire story of the Iliad. In the epic owing 
to its scale every part is treated at proper length; with a drama, however, on the same 
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story the result is very disappointing. This is shown by the fact that all who have 
dramatized the fall of Ilium in its entirety, and not part by part, like Euripides, or the 
whole of the Niobe story, instead of a portion, like Aeschylus, either fail utterly or 
have but ill success on the stage; for that and that alone was enough to ruin a play by 
Agathon. Yet in their Peripeties, as also in their simple plots, the poets I mean show 
wonderful skill in aiming at the kind of effect they desire—a tragic situation that 
arouses the human feeling in one, like the clever villain (e.g. Sisyphus) deceived, or 
the brave wrongdoer worsted (On the Art of Poetry, chapter 18). 
Success or failure in executing the intention clearly is the kind of question the critic 
discusses and demonstration is by relating the work in question to established artistic 
principles and those pertaining to the specific art form. 
 Aristotle’s art forms comprise a total of six, including architecture, which he names in 
the Ethics. The others are listed in On the Art of Poetry as painting, sculpting, music, 
dancing, and poetry. Our specific concern in this paper is with poetry – the art form which 
depends on language alone (monon logois). In Aristotle’s terms, language pertains to the 
conditions of possibility of art when that art is poetry. Other conditions of possibility are 
mentioned in the definition of art above: the appropriate state of mind, exercise of true 
reason, and the contingent matter. There is also the existence of form, which he partially 
discusses in the above passage. 
 Poetry (literature) is alone among the arts in displaying in physical form its affiliation 
to an ethno-linguistic group. Technology is of course involved in all the arts, but 
technology spreads and is quickly learned and may even be adopted so that links to the 
place it was innovated are easily forgotten and cease to matter. The notes on the musical 
bar are the common property of human kind, but a specific timbre may be the 
contribution of a specific technological innovation. The equipment may be locally 
adapted or obtained in the open market. Henceforth its resources may be fully exploited. 
The technology of dye making may similarly be acquired, or the dye itself, which may be 
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exploited and applied anywhere, without necessarily betraying its original source. 
Language spread, however, has not yet been able to endow any language with the same 
sense of homelessness. This is why Obiajunwa Wali’s question about the language of 
African literature which was first raised in 1961 remains relevant today. A similar sense 
of the native tongue caused the Nobel Laureate Czesław Miłosz who lived as an exile in 
the West during the Cold War to feel a constant need to ‘return to the sources of his 
poetry … to the roots of the Polish language’ (Klaus 169). Miłosz was native of a country 
the repeated partitioning of which at the end of the eighteenth century may have 
provided the blueprint for the European Partition of Africa a century later. The same 
country had been overrun by Russia during the Second World War and colonized as it 
were. 
 For Miłosz, therefore, language is not just the medium of poetry: it is the source. It is 
not clear whether the scholars who debated Obi Wali’s dilemma understood him in that 
spirit. For instance, B.I. Chukwukere’s answer is that what matters is the writer’s 
‘integration … of the diverse aspects of the novel, i.e. character, plot, story, language or 
style in general. Such an association yields high quality results – a novel rich in texture, 
artistically coherent and therefore enjoyable’; for the ‘acid test for our African writers in 
English is the degree to which each proves himself a real master of his medium, for such 
is the gateway to entertainment – a prime object of literature’ (17). In the light of Miłosz’s 
practice and attitude towards his mother tongue, Chukwukere would seem to be missing 
the point altogether. The question has much less to do with what the reader does or is 
enabled to do by the work than with the identity of the work itself.  
 On the other hand, people like Ngara argue that although Obi Wali has a valid point 
in advocating African literature and criticism in African languages, failing which only 
‘sterility, uncreativity, and frustration’ may be expected (Ngara 6), ‘we have seen the rise 
of a great literature during the last twenty years’ and ‘the signs are that, far from being 
frustrated, African writers writing in European languages are growing from strength to 
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strength’ (6-7). Ohaegbu is in agreement with Ngara on this point, but notes that people 
like Ngugi and Sembene Ousmanne ‘have now taken bold steps in using African 
languages as the medium of expression in their creative works’ (2000: 10). I note, however, 
that for Miłosz art is not a medium of expression; it is a reality standing on its own ground; 
a creation that needs to be characterized for what it is in itself or – following the 
phenomenologists – as it appears. Lewis Nkosi, however, has another view of art, 
maintaining that ‘if in trying to rehabilitate their smashed-up cultures African writers are 
forced to write in a foreign language, their task must obviously remain incomplete’ (7). 
This view of literary language as nothing more than a ‘tool to be used by craftsmen of the 
word responding to "social orders"’ is called by Rzhevsky ‘totalitarianism’ (405). 
 There may be a problem with the manner of statement of the problem of language by 
Wali; for if there is such a thing as ‘a particular language whose peculiar mode of being 
is “literary”’ (Foucault 2002: 326), a key aspect of leadership in the development of 
African literature must be the evolving of a vernacular ‘literary language’. For example, 
Pushkin is said to have played a pioneering role in Russian literary history, and has 
wound up, ‘the acknowledged “father of Russian literature” and of the modern Russian 
literary language’ (Cornwell ix). This requires a language mastery at a level beyond the 
facility to translate from one language into another or the mere capacity to describe in a 
language. It will not happen without the ‘first bold step’ taken by the likes of Ngugi and 
Sembene Ousmane, but whether or not they have achieved that ‘literary language’ will 
be determined by scholarly effort. The evolution of a literary language in the West and 
Eastern Europe is connected to evangelization and translation of religious texts. The role 
of the King James Version of the Bible in the English tradition is well known. Similarly, 
Russian literary language is connected to the translation of religious texts. We read: 
The arrival of Christianity in Rus’ was accompanied by the new religion’s inseparable 
concomitant, a fully-fledged literary language known to us as Old Church Slavonic. 
The ‘Apostles to the Slavs’, Cyril and Methodius, with their assistants, devised Old 
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Church Slavonic as a written language to express the conceptual world of the Bible, 
the Church Fathers, theology, and late-antique ‘high culture’ generally (through 
complex structures and a large abstract vocabulary, for example), basing this 
language on the South Slav speech of the hinterland of Thessaloniki, from which they 
came (Milner-Gulland 15) 
The opportunity to evolve a literary language based on the highly complex biblical world 
has not been made use of in Chinua Achebe’s land mainly because of quarrels over the 
dialect of Igbo to serve the entire region. In Russia, as elsewhere, literature was to free 
itself from the religious language; and that is where the innovative poets in the local 
language come in. It is reported that the first movements of change in the evolution of 
Russian literary language were in refining the metrics through ‘the combined efforts of 
Trediakovsky and Lomonosov’ (Jones 29). But there was political leadership as well, as 
official documents were prepared in colloquial Russian from the time of Peter the Great 
onwards. Literary language is therefore not a matter of register or effects. It has a poetic 
and is capable of speaking not by means of what it says alone but also by the rhythm and 
the cadence native to or supported by that language. The literary artist makes 
contribution to the evolution of a literary language not by exercise of power to manipulate 
the colloquial or ‘everyday’ language, as the Formalists call it, but by having and 
exercising a certain ‘sense of language’ (Rzhevsky 404). The literary artist is in the 
strongest position of all the language workers to grow and evolve this sense, since 
according to Foucault, listening is a very important aspect of his mission: 
the poet is he who, beneath the named, constantly expected differences, rediscovers 
the buried kinships between things, their scattered resemblances. Beneath the 
established signs, and in spite of them, he hears another, deeper, discourse, which 
recalls the time when words glittered in the universal resemblance of things (2002: 55). 
Thus the German poet, Paul Celan’s ‘You Lie in the Great Listening’ seems to address 
itself in a special way to the poet. 
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Functioning of Language in Literature 
Courses in literary theory are designed to present theoretical approaches, usually derived 
from other disciplines mainly within the Human and social sciences, which open certain 
doors in literary works or help to throw light on aspects of literature, such as Marxism, 
psychoanalysis, history/historicism, philosophy and ethics, cultural anthropology, and 
gender studies. By use of these approaches and concepts there is often a richer 
understanding of character or incident, discourse or power relations, but language is 
usually explored in these approaches for its information content about the specific object 
of interest, whether it be the hidden motivations of character or the ideological basis of 
decisions which appear on the surface to be disinterested. These differ from theories of 
literature, which are general statements that attempt to answer the question, what is 
literature? These kinds of statement are relatively few in number and whatever they say 
about literature is a total statement aware of the work as a linguistic event, aware of 
language as ‘the mode of being of literature’ (Foucault 418).  
 The being of language in literature complicates the question of literature. Is literature 
the same as its language or are they two different things? Foucault’s formulation above, 
however, unveils the language element as a factor of being, not just existence, with respect 
to which there could be alternatives. For instance, we could follow up Foucault to the 
effect that painting, sculpting, music, and poetry are modes of existence of art, but spirit 
and matter are modes of being. Accordingly, literature is language or nothing. It is not 
any language at all, however, that is in question, but that ‘whose peculiar mode of being 
is “literary”’. Here again it is a question of being. In Foucault there is a coincidence 
between literature and language, provided it is the specific linguistic form. The features 
of this language are carefully mapped in The Order of Things, but it is also shown that this 
language has been going through an evolutionary process: 
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It may be said in a sense that ‘literature’, as it was constituted and so designated on 
the threshold of the modern age, manifests, at a time when it was least expected, the 
reappearance, of the living being of language. In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the peculiar existence and ancient solidity of language as a thing inscribed 
in the fabric of the world were dissolved in the functioning of representation; all 
language had value only as discourse. The art of language was a way of ‘making a 
sign’ – of simultaneously signifying something and arranging signs around that thing; 
an art of naming, therefore, and then, by means of a reduplication both demonstrative 
and decorative, of capturing that name, of enclosing and concealing it, of designating 
it in turn by other names that were the deferred presence of the ﬁrst name, its 
secondary sign, its ﬁguration, its rhetorical panoply. And yet, throughout the 
nineteenth century, and right up to our own day … literature achieved autonomous 
existence, and separated itself from all other language with a deep scission, only by 
forming a sort of ‘counter-discourse’, and by ﬁnding its way back from the 
representative or signifying function of language to this raw being that had been 
forgotten since the sixteenth century. It is possible to believe that one has attained the 
very essence of literature when one is no longer interrogating it at the level of what it 
says but only in its signiﬁcant form: in doing so, one is limiting one’s view of language 
to its Classical status. In the modern age, literature is that which compensates for (and 
not that which conﬁrms) the signifying function of language. Through literature, the 
being of language shines once more on the frontiers of Western culture – and at its 
centre – for it is what has been most foreign to that culture since the sixteenth century 
(48-49). 
Two key points, therefore, to note are (1) evolutionary change in this language; (2) 
differences in function even within the same era. By the first, literary language does not 
necessarily behave in the same way in every literary work, as the language has changed 
in structure over time, first, some time between the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
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centuries. Then it changed again in the nineteenth century. What is called realism marks 
a phase in the evolution of literary language, but that phase passed, opening a different 
situation of language in which, according to Foucault here, it ‘compensates for’ instead 
of confirming ‘the signifying function of language’. 
 With respect to the differences in function, language is seen to signify, to illuminate, 
to conceal, to name, to compensate for signification, and so on. The common view that 
language is constituted for communication says but little about the capabilities of 
language. And the capabilities are many and varied. But, according to Heidegger, to think 
of the capabilities is only to start a reflection on language which will lead ultimately to 
the question, who man is. The right understanding of language is in the resolution of this 
question. He writes, 
Language serves to give information. As a fit instrument for this, it is a ‘possession’. 
But the essence of language does not consist entirely in being a means of giving 
information. This definition does not touch its essential essence, but merely indicates 
an effect of its essence. Language is not a mere tool, one of the many which man 
possesses; on the contrary, it is only language that affords the very possibility of 
standing in the openness of the existent. Only where there is language, is there world, 
i.e. the perpetually altering circuit of decision and production, of action and 
responsibility, but also of commotion and arbitrariness, of decay and confusion. Only 
where world predominates, is there history. Language is a possession in a more 
fundamental sense. It is good for the fact that (i.e. it affords a guarantee that) man can 
exist historically. Language is not a tool at his disposal, rather it is that event which 
disposes of the supreme possibility of human existence (Existence and Being 299-300). 
The concept world is fundamental in Heidegger. It includes consciousness of one’s space, 
one’s time, one’s relatedness by reason of which ‘man can exist historically’. Because man 
has language, and is in fact immersed in it, he exists historically, which also means, in a 
shared history with others of his kind. A linguistic act, in other words, is first and 
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foremost self-actualization, or perhaps self-disclosure. As Paul Ricoeur puts it, the word 
‘becomes word at the moment when man becomes speech, when speech becomes 
discourse’ (1974: 92). Human existence is fundamentally rooted in language; and 
language expresses itself in functions which, for that reason, are factors in interpretation. 
It was inevitable that language should enter into that practical activity of making by true 
reason acting on contingent matter. Some of the ancient forms of these productions are 
narrative, first encountered ‘when the world of the mythical begins as it were to flow … 
when it becomes a world not of mere being but of action’ (Cassirer 105). As an archetypal 
form, narrative, as much as drama and lyric, represents ‘what is present as immediate 
reality in the sacred action’ (210). Northrop Frye highlights a second evolutionary path 
not directly connected to ritual as in Cassirer’s account. He teaches that ‘patterns of 
imagery … or fragments of significance are oracular in origin, and derive from the 
epiphanic moment, the flash of instantaneous comprehension with no direct reference to 
time’ which are ultimately received ‘in the form of proverbs, riddles, commandments and 
etiological folktales’ (1976: 429). 
 Literature is an act of language: what it here makes is directly an artwork, which is at 
the same time representation. According to Bathes, it is basically, 
geometrical discourse in that it cuts out segments in order to depict them: to discourse 
(the classics would have said) is simply 'to depict the tableau one has in one's mind'. 
The scene, the picture, the shot, the cut-out rectangle, here we have the very condition 
that allows us to conceive theatre, painting, cinema, literature, all those arts, that is, 
other than music and which could be called dioptric arts…. The tableau (pictorial, 
theatrical, literary) is a pure cut-out segment with clearly defined edges, irreversible 
and incorruptible; everything that surrounds it is banished into nothingness, remains 
unnamed, while everything that it admits within its field is promoted into essence, 
into light, into view (1977: 70). 
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The function of language in representation can clearly be made out, namely to be the 
means of representation taking place. There is yet another function which is discernible 
in Frye’s account of imagery. For the content of the tableau in riddles and etiological 
folktales is really language itself. In theories of literature, the explanation of language is 
either as the medium of representation (Aristotle), or the matter of representation 
(Formalism, Heidegger). In Foucault, this event of language becoming matter is the turn 
in which modernism is born, whereby literature achieves autonomy. Between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, the age of realism, ‘The art of language was a way of 
“making a sign” – of simultaneously signifying something and arranging signs around 
that thing; an art of naming…. [During] the nineteenth century, and right up to our own 
day … literature achieved autonomous existence, and separated itself from all other 
language with a deep scission, only by forming a sort of “counter-discourse”, and by 
ﬁnding its way back from the representative or signifying function of language to this 
raw being that had been forgotten since the sixteenth century’ (48). The autonomy in 
question is from everything that traditionally surrounded poetry: the action, as object of 
representation, the poet as the owner of the vision, the target audience eagerly awaiting 
a message, and thus ‘from the strict binding to the deictic field’ (Bühler, 2011: 425). There 
is also unbinding from the normal operations of tense; hence the ‘narrative present 
includes an indefinite now sphere within which the person now speaking and the one 
addressed have duration’ (433). 
 Thus textual autonomy demands a different way of reading literary works than the 
one which prevailed under realism in which a distinction was often tenable between 
‘form’ and ‘content’ and worked on the idea that ‘language is the expression, produced 
by men, of their feelings and the world view that guides them. Can the spell this idea has 
cast over language be broken?’ (Heidegger, 2001: 194.) In a reading of Hölderlin’s ‘A 
Winter Evening’, which does not fall under what is known as modernist poetry, 
Heidegger shows that poetry’s relationship to language is altogether free of that spell: 
2Journal of Studies in Social Sciences                                                        245 
We expect from [the poem’s title] the description of a winter evening as it actually is. 
But the poem does not picture a winter evening occurring somewhere, sometimes. It 
neither merely describes a winter evening that is already there, nor does it attempt to 
produce the semblance, leave the impression, of a winter evening's presence where 
there is no such winter evening…. Everyone knows that a poem is an invention. It is 
imaginative even where it seems to be descriptive. In his fictive act the poet pictures 
to himself something that could be present in its presence. The poem, as composed, 
images what is thus fashioned for our own act of imaging. In the poem's speaking the 
poetic imagination gives itself utterance…. The language of the poem is a manifold 
enunciating (194-195). 
Heidegger is not speaking about what happens in European poetry, but what happens in 
poetry and part of the expectation that the critic brings along in reading. For a critic’s 
regard of a literary work is inevitably focused on language. What he sees before him is 
language: the poem is the art of language.  
 Chinua Achebe who first made African literature a space of interplay of African and 
Western European literatures with his Things Fall Apart overlying Yeats’s ‘The Second 
Coming’ as a background formation and model for re-thinking of history was also to 
announce that language would become a spectacle in African literature – and he meant 
English: 
Most African writers write out of an African experience and of commitment to an 
African destiny. For them that destiny does not include a future European identity for 
which the present is but an apprenticeship. And let no one be fooled by the fact that 
we may write in English for we intend to do unheard of things with it. Already some 
people are getting worried (1988: 50). 
For Achebe, writing ‘out of an African experience and of commitment to an African 
destiny’ is enough answer to Obi Wali’s question about African literature in non-African 
languages. Literary language is ‘a milieu in which … cultural ideals could reside’ 
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(Verburg, 1998: 228). It is as if language does not matter all that much, except insofar as 
one would make a spectacle of it. But his concerns, African cultural identity and writing 
out of an African experience are genuine concerns for an artist. He is indicating here the 
double destinations of literature on which Miłosz is somewhat more explicit where he 
remarks: ‘I have always felt that a poet participates in the management of the estate of 
poetry, of that in his own language and also that of world poetry’ (1996: xv).  
 In sub-Sahara Africa, much of what may be called poetry in one’s ‘own language’ is 
really traditional oral poetry and associated verbal arts. Modern literature remains 
dominantly in the languages of the former colonists. The literary tradition of a country 
like Nigeria is covered by writing ‘out of an African experience’. In practice, this boils 
down to the nationality of the writer – there is no way of assessing or ascertaining the 
African experience, since it seems not to have any recognizable and describable features. 
The out of, however, seems to carry a sense of a contribution coming from Africa. The 
poetic tradition to which these writers contribute belongs to the whole world. Because of 
the bond of literature to language, this world literature is made up of a host of languages 




Translation is a known language function and the task is special when the matter for 
translation is literature. Other kinds of translation often treat language as a medium, with 
a content which may be put in one set of words or another or conveyed in one language 
or another without suffering damage. But there is no literary translation that is anything 
but provisional. Another translation with something to recommend it is always possible. 
But if there are two translations, both acceptable to specialists, but differing in some ways, 
are they both the same work? 
2Journal of Studies in Social Sciences                                                        247 
 There is a deeper problem, which depends on what is determined as the nature of 
literature, and therefore what theory of literature one follows. In the Aristotelian tradition, 
translation should be a matter of putting together another set of words in the target 
language which would adequately mediate the action of the original. But translation 
would seem to be impossible in the Heideggerian, where ‘language speaks’. His book 
Existence and Being containing both his discussion of Hölderlin’s ‘A Winter Evening’ and 
the poem itself is in English translation. A good translation of the philosophical part of 
his book is expected to continue to be acceptable for many years to come. But the poem 
is different; and one must ask: does the English version speak in the same way, speak the 
same words as the original German? Although Heidegger and the Formalists treat 
language as the raw material of poetry the dilemma does not seem as irreconcilable for 
Formalism, since in the latter case poetry does no more than make language strange and 
difficult. There is no reason why the same strangeness and difficulty could not be 
recreated in the target language. But as far as Heidegger is concerned, what exactly is 
being translated? Is translation served by substituting one language by another? Does the 
poem remain, in that case, or have we a new poem? 
 It is recognized in translation studies that poetry poses special challenges in 
translation. A poet like Czesław Miłosz was for long considered ‘untranslatable’, but in 
recent times ‘a co-operative effort of several people including poets and translators has 
made it possible to find Miłosz's poetry published in English and French’ (Biolik 163). 
Poetic translations involve ‘scoping out a situation and adjusting to it’ (Robinson, 1997: 
187). And there is also need, according to Wechsler (1998), ‘to reproduce the materiality 
of the signs, its physical properties’. But the difficulty of translation subsists precisely in 
this, according to Derrida: 
Materiality is precisely that which translation relinquishes. To relinquish materiality: 
such is the driving force of translation. And when that materiality is reinstated, 
translation becomes poetry (2001: 264).  
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There is some suggestion here that a translation may indeed become a poem. Some 
suggested guidelines are to attempt to replicate the effect of the original (Fawcett, 1997: 
114); ‘to experiment, to tamper, to extend the creative act of writing "difficultly" or 
"abusively" into the target-language text’ if ‘conforming to source-language usage’ 
produces an undesirable ‘complicity’ with the original (Robinson 134), or ‘leaves the least 
latitude for paraphrase and interpretation’ (Wechsler 54). But if a translator will recapture 
the vitality of the original, ‘a total immersion in the work’ is needed so as ‘to have some 
kind of affinity’ with it (32).  
 The need for interpretation exists for the translation as much as for the original 
because of the problem of meaning in all art. In Derrida, the specificity of the work is that: 
it is the totality of form and meaning, for what is in question, in this case, is meaning 
rethought as form; and structure is the formal unity of form and meaning. It will be 
said that this neutralization of meaning by form is the author’s responsibility before 
being the critic’s (Writing and Difference 4). 
The work is one form or another: it is bound up with its own form; and the form shapes 
both the meaning and the language intertwined with it, being wholly ‘woven into the 
very fabric it is unrolling’ (The Order of Things 87). Derrida does not forsake Aristotle in 
accounting for art as meaning rethought as form, for as we have seen, it is a guiding 
principle in Aristotle for the artist to submit to the rule of form in his compositions. He 
should also remember not to ‘write a tragedy on an epic body of incident (i.e. one with a 
plurality of stories in it), by attempting to dramatize, for instance, the entire story of the 
Iliad. In the epic owing to its scale every part is treated at proper length; with a drama, 
however, on the same story the result is very disappointing’. Form is therefore not 
primarily a term of classification but a category ‘of production and of labour’ (Ricoeur, 
1981: 136). 
The lyric form, for instance, involves a figural rethink of meaning. Such is 
undoubtedly the case with Paul Celan’s ‘I Know You’. The German original is:  
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(Ich kenne dich, du bist die tief Gebeugte,  
ich, der Durchbohrte, bin dir untertan. 
Wo flammt ein Wort, das für uns beide zeugte?  
Du—ganz, ganz wirklich. Ich—ganz Wahn.) 
In his study of this poem, Bellm presents four versions in addition to his own, which is 
deliberately close to the words of the original – as follows: 
(I know you—you're the one bent low,  
and I, pierced through, am your underling.  
Where does a word flame forth, to witness for us both?  
You, so completely real—I, completely not / a complete illusion.) 
The other translations he presents seem to be farther removed from the words of the 
original: 
Pierre Joris: 
(I know you, you are the deeply bowed,  
I the transpierced, am subject to you.  
Where flames a word, would testify for us both?  
You—all, all real. I—all delusion) 
 
Felstiner: 
(I know you, you're the one bent over low,  
and I, the one pierced through, am in your need.  
Where flames a word to witness for us both?  
You—wholly real. I—wholly mad.) 
  
Nikolai Popov and Heather McHugh: 
(I know you: you're the one who's bent so low.  
You hold me—I'm the riddled one—in bondage.  
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What word could burn as witness for us two?  
You're my reality. I'm your mirage.) 
 
Robert Hass: 
(I know: you are the one  
Pierced through. I'm the one  
Bent low beside you, trying  
To peer into your eyes.) 
Another Celan scholar, Paul Coates, has his own translation, which is close enough to the 
words in the original, but shows more signs of interpretation than Bellm’s: 
(I know you: you are the one bowed deeply, 
I am the pierced one, subject unto you. 
Where does a word flare out as both our witness? 
You—quite, quite real. And I—mad through and through.) 
There is no doubt that interpretation is part and parcel of the translation effort in each 
case and none is a simple literal interpretation. While Robert Hass’s version seems to 
interpret exhaustively, some of the others both interpret and leave more room for further 
interpretation. For instance, Paul Coats’s ‘I know you, you are the one bowed deeply’ 
seems to me to involve both fellow-feeling and accusation, which renders the ‘subject 
unto you’ of the second line deeply ironic. 
 It may be assumed that the driving force for new translations where other translations 
exist is the need to effect the poetry of the original, a new ‘expression of the poem’s 
essence’ (Wechsler 140) – although some are driven by the need to make sense of a very 
difficult original. But it serves a key function: it creates or affirms the sense that there is a 
world poetry which belongs to humanity, to which every human being has a right of 
access. This challenges the claim often encountered in comparative literature circles that 
one must access the poem in its original language. On this view, nobody would have read, 
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really read Homer’s Odyssey or Sophocles’ Oedipus the King if they had only seen a 
translation. This claim is a restatement of property rights: the cultural-linguistic group is 
thereby affirmed as properly owning its literature, with mastery of the language 
conferring admission rights. In such a situation, classical Latin literature would be 
without a proper owner. 
 
Conclusion 
The main functions of language envisioned by the theories of literature; that it mediates 
representation; that it is the contingent matter of the making (poiesis) called literature; that 
it is the means of rethinking of meaning as form have outcomes in criticism. Aristotelian 
criticism focuses on the action and the character involved. Heidegger explores the 
linguistic event as a speech act of language, while Derrida is exercised by the meaning 
structures being constructed, as to their holding together and how. These theories of 
literature also advert to the other arts for their contribution in a clearer perception of 
literary art. In Aristotle, the doctrine on language neatly falls into place in an economical 
model of art in which all are modes of representation (mimesis), differing only in the 
medium, language for poetry, colour for painting, shape for sculpture, sound and rhythm 
for music, rhythm alone for dancing. But this model leaves out architecture, which is 
counted in his Ethics among the arts. The Formalists restrict their discussions to the 
traditional arts, but there is no reason why their idea of ‘self-sufficient matter’ should not 
apply to things like cotton, wool, and other inputs in technological productions. 
Heidegger differs from them in this regard in that he has a method for distinguishing ‘art’ 
from other made things which he calls ‘equipment’. But Derrida’s theory is traditional in a 
surprising way because the forms for rethinking of meaning are given by tradition, going 
back to the time when ‘Myth, language and art [made up] a concrete, undivided unity’ 
before they ‘gradually resolved into a triad of independent modes of spiritual creativity’ 
(Cassirer, Language and Myth 98). In this mythic environment, form is the content of art: 
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one might follow Witkiewicz and say ‘pure form’. The humans who have thus emerged 
as a group with myth, language, and art begin their history as a group accompanied by 
this symbolic language, which both carries and bears witness to their cultural and 
historical experiences, the cadence and echo of which will continue to be ‘heard’ 
(Foucault), by the one lying ‘in the great listening’. It should be expected that ‘African 
experience’ going into world literature is the one tempered by this listening and 
combining the sensitivities of the poet who works in his own native tongue and that 
passion of the translator for the poem to come alive in another language than the 
birthplace. 
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